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1. Introduction 
”Understanding about the nature and determinants of demand is arguably the most important 
empirical issue in analysis of professional sporting markets. Team owners and managers, 
sporting league administrators, and public policy-makers or regulators simply cannot make 
correct judgements on issues of vital importance to them, without having some knowledge 
about demand.” (Borland and MacDonald, 2003) 
 
Norwegian premiership football has apparently never experienced more popularity like the 
popularity we have seen the last couple of years. Never has so much money been involved in 
the sport and the clubs can be considered as medium sized firms with some having budgets 
higher than 100 million NOK. The income from ticket sale is an important revenue source, 
implying that knowledge about the demand for the sport is of vital importance. Even though 
“demand for sport” studies have been common practice in sporting leagues abroad, there are 
few contributions on this field in Norway. Johnsen and Solvoll (2007) analyse however in 
their article the demand for televised football. They examine the TV-ratings and how they are 
influenced by factors specific to television on the one hand and factors specific to football on 
the other hand. 
 
This thesis seeks to answer how the demand for Norwegian premiership football is affected 
by live televising of games on a public broadcaster. The televising of games in Norway is 
unique in respect to the number of games which are broadcasted live. The result of a 1 billion 
NOK media contract effective from the 2006 season was that all games in the premiership 
were broadcasted live either on public television or on subscription TV. Watching football for 
free can be viewed as a substitute to attend the match at the arena, and one should therefore 
expect that public broadcasting reduces attendance on those matches. 
 
In my analysis I make use of detailed match specific data from the 2006 and 2007 season to 
control for potentially other determinants of the attendance. These data capture economic 
variables, uncertainty variables, quality of viewing variables etc. The method used is a fixed 
effect regression analysis, implying that both observable and unobservable fixed 
characteristics of the home teams the respective seasons are accounted for. The analysis has 
been carried out in the program package PcGive10. 
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Carrying out an analysis on demand for sport, four key methodological challenges must be 
addressed. First, like in all empirical work one needs to obtain good data. As there is no 
complete data set for my purpose, I have used data from different sources in the creation of a 
suitable data set. Second, there are challenges related to the quality of measurement of 
variables. This is especially the case on uncertainty variables, which is heavily discussed 
among sport economists. Third, there are potential problems of omitted variable bias. As there 
are many observable and unobservable determinants of demand, and the relationships are 
complex, caution must be expressed when analysing the results. To avoid that unobservable 
determinants of demand create spurious relationship between live broadcasting and 
attendance, this analysis include a battery of fixed effects. Fourth, capacity constraints make it 
difficult to measure demand. This is however not of great concern in this study as the 
proportion of sold out stadium is relatively small. 
 
I find no evidences that public broadcasting of games reduces attendance significantly. The 
results show rather a weak positive influence on attendance when matches are broadcasted on 
the largest public broadcaster TV2. That people attend matches just because they are televised 
sounds unreasonable. Both the theory and the data build up on the hypothesis that the 
broadcaster makes no random choice of which games to televise. Their preferences are very 
much like the preferences of the supporters. The broadcaster is also interested in stadiums 
which are crowded and has a good atmosphere. That creates better television, implying higher 
TV ratings and more income from the advertisers. Furthermore, there is reasonable to believe 
that the broadcaster’s advertise for the game they broadcast, also acts as advertising for the 
game itself and increases attendance. 
 
The lack of demand for football studies in Norway is somewhat surprising as the popularity 
apparently has risen to a level where not even the sky seems to be logical limit. In the 
following I give in chapter (2) some background information about the Norwegian 
premiership division, Tippeligaen, and its rising popularity. I also briefly present the 
economics of sport and the media. Their interdependence resulted in 2005 in a historical TV-
agreement, which I also shortly present. In chapter (3) I outline the economic theory on the 
demand for sport. This is based on general demand theory. Then I will discuss the factors 
which might have an impact on the demand, including the impact of televised games. The 
discussion is based on the existing literature which I also present. I chapter (4) I go through 
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the data set and how the data are obtained. Chapter (5) presents the model used and the 
methodological framework. I also comment the descriptive statistics in this section. I examine 
the results of my econometric analysis in chapter (6) and discuss the final results. A 
conclusion is given in chapter (7). 
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2. Background 
2.1 Tippeligaen 
Tippeligaen is the name of the top division of professional football in Norway. It consists of 
14 teams, which are competing to be the league champions. The league starts normally in the 
month of April and ends in the beginning of November. The teams play against each other 
twice a season, one home game and one away game. Thus, each team play 26 matches in a 
season that totally consists of 182 matches. A victory gives the winning team three points, a 
draw gives each team one point and a loss gives zero points. The team with most points after 
the 26 rounds is the league champion. The two bottom teams are regulated to the 1.division 
(also referred to as Adeccoligaen), while the two first teams in the 1.division are promoted to 
Tippeligaen. The twelfth place in Tippeligaen and number three in Adeccoligaen meet each 
other in a play off match (home and away) to decide which team to play the next season in the 
top division. 
 
Top division football has a long tradition in Norway. The first league tournament started up 
for real in 1937. It was divided into two regional leagues with eight teams each, where each 
regions winner met each other in a final. Clubs from northern part of Norway did not have the 
opportunity to take part in the league at this time. From 1963 the league tournament took the 
form as we know it today. The top division then consisted of ten teams competing for the 
championship. Clubs from northern Norway was still not allowed to participate. The region 
entered first the top division in 1972 when the league extended to 12 teams. The number of 
teams was held fixed until 1994, when the league extended to 14 teams (Goksøyr and Olstad, 
2002). 
 
The popularity of Tippeligaen has the last ten fifteen years risen dramatically. The popularity 
of football in general has always been relatively strong in Norway, but due to the national 
team and Rosenborg’s success in the 90’s, football has in many ways become the new 
national sport in Norway. The national team played their second and third world cup in 1994 
and 1998, respectively. This was the first time since 1932 they took part in the tournament. 
Rosenborg experienced year after year from the mid 90’s success in the UEFA Champions 
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League.1 Rosenborg continued their European success into the new millennium, while the 
national team last participated in an international tournament in the European Championship 
in 2000. 
 
Rosenborg dominated the domestic league by winning 13 championships in a row during the 
seasons 1992 to 2004. Vålerenga broke their domination by winning the league in 2005. This 
was a sign that competitive balance was brought the back into Norwegian football which can 
be argued further has increased the popularity. Media has also played an important role in the 
boost for Norwegian football. Figure 1 below shows the attendance development since the 
first season of Tippeligaen in 1991. While the average attendance was between 5 000 and  
6 000 in the 90’s the attendance started to rise in the new millennium. In 2007 the average 
attendance passed 10 000 for the first time. 
 
Figure1 
Average Attendance Tippeligaen 1991-2007
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2.2 The Economics of Sport and the Media 
2.2.1 The Relationship Sport and Media 
The relationship between sport and media is close. Television rights are the main source of 
income for many sports, and sport is important to attract television audiences. Considering 
first the sport’s dependence for media, the media is not only an important factor to generate 
direct income through sales of broadcasting rights. Media coverage also raises the sport’s 
profile, which generates interest among the public and sponsors. From media’s point of view 
                                                 
1 UEFA Champions League is a tournament between the best clubs in Europe. 
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sport is a valuable commodity and the money television companies spend on sports has 
increased rapidly the last decades. A convenient example should be what the American 
television company CBS has paid for the rights to the Summer Olympics. For the Moscow 
games in 1980 they paid $88 million, but to the Athens games 2004 the price had risen to 
$1493 million (Jeanrenaud and Késenne, 2006).2 Popular team sports are important for the 
broadcasters because it raises advertising money. Among a considerable proportion of the 
viewers, other entertainment or conventional programs are not a good substitute for the most 
popular sport programs. Thus, advertising on other programs also is a bad substitute for 
advertising on sport programs (Noll, 2007). 
 
An important reason why the rights have risen substantially in price the last decades is the 
structural change of the market. Up to the middle of the 1980s each European country had a 
public broadcaster and a sport federation. From that on there was a liberalisation and the 
governments around in Europe allowed private companies to produce television. There also 
was a dramatic change in technology. Free to air television was the dominant platform until 
the beginning of the 1980s. Today there are a number of platforms and delivery mechanisms 
the right owners can chose to use (Jeanrenaud and Késenne, 2006).  Noll (2007) has pointed 
out three phenomena which occurred as a result of the growth in commercial television and 
television became more competitive: 
 
(1) A shift of sports rights from public to commercial television 
(2) An increase in the fees for sports rights 
(3) An increase in sport coverage 
(Noll, 2007) 
 
Looking at the case of Norway we definitely see the same as in rest of Europe. In 1980 when 
NRK still was a state run monopoly company the Norwegian Football Association (NFF) 
earned 1 million NOK each year selling media rights. This had risen to 40 million NOK in 
1998 when NRK and TV2 cooperated in broadcasting Tippeligaen (Gaustad, 2000). 
Considering the amount of broadcasters, TVNorge and TV3 were the two channels which first 
broke the monopoly of NRK starting up with regular programs in the late 1980s. In 1989 
TVNorge made their first agreement with NFF which allowed them to show recorded matches 
from Tippeligaen and highlights from international football outside the Norwegian season. 
The big fights of the TV rights was in any case between NRK and TV2, which started regular 
                                                 
2 The authors do not consider the fact that the USA boycotted the Moscow games.  
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programs in 1992 (Helland and Ytre-Arne, 2007). From 1994 to 2005 the two broadcasting 
companies did however share, through different agreements, the rights of broadcasting 
Tippeliga football. NFF also has an interest in selling the rights to one of or both of these 
actors. The two broadcasters can both reach the broadest audience which is important to 
sustain and increase the popularity of the sport. Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006) explicitly 
say: 
 
The Federations know – or ought to know – that it is in their interest to maintain a wide audience in order to 
guarantee the future popularity of the sports that they represent. For this reason, rights do not always go to 
the highest bidder. (Jeanrenaud and Késenne, 2006) 
 
2.2.2 Individual versus Collective Sale of Rights 
In Norway the sale of the rights to Tippeligaen are centralized, implying that NFF is the actor 
that sells the TV rights. The Norwegian Competition Authorities (Konkurransetilsynet) has 
criticized NFF that this is likely to be forbidden by the competition law. The rights namely 
belong to both NFF and the clubs playing in Tippeligaen.3 Under individual sale of TV rights, 
the TV-companies negotiate with each single club to broadcast the respective club’s home 
games, while collective sale of TV rights implies that the league as a whole negotiates with 
the companies. Under the collective sale system the revenues from the sale of rights are 
allocated between the clubs subject to a sharing rule. Both types of sale are to be found in the 
respective European football leagues (Falconieri et al, 2004).  
 
There are arguments in favour and against the respective policies on sales of TV rights, and it 
is hard to make a strong conclusion on whether rights should be sold collectively or 
individually. In the long run, however, it seems profitable to have a collectively sale of rights, 
mainly because of the competitive balance argument. Increasing differences in the clubs’ 
financial situation disturb the competitive balance in European football (Groot, 2008). A sale 
of TV rights policy which makes these differences larger should not be argued for. This is 
also in line with what Andreff and Bourg (2006) conclude. They have looked at the five major 
leagues in Europe, the French, German, English, Spanish and Italian league, where the two 
latter ones, in contrast to the three first ones, have individual sale of rights. They argue that 
the competitive balance is significantly lower in Spain and Italy, but that their teams perform 
                                                 
3 KonkurranseNytt December 2004: “Vil ha dialog med fotballforbundet om salg av TV rettigheter”.– an 
information paper from the Norwegian Competition Authorities 
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better in the European cups, because of their financial advantage in respect to sale of TV 
rights.  
2.2.3 Free-to-Air or Pay-TV? 
As mentioned above there has been a rapid development in the broadcasting technology, 
implying that the broadcaster can chose different platforms when broadcasting their programs. 
The development has also leaded to the opportunity to exclude viewers by charging payment 
for watching a channel or a program; subscription- or pay per view based broadcasting. 
Obviously broadcasting sport is then not a pure public good, since the non-excludable 
assumption vanishes. The non-rivalry assumption is however still valid; a viewer watching a 
game does not prevent other viewers watching the same game. The non-rivalry property of the 
good represents a market failure, because what the consumers have to pay exceeds the 
marginal cost, which is zero. Thus, free to air television seems to prevent such a welfare loss. 
Another argument of market failure related to pricing mechanism must then however be taken 
into account. The free to air broadcasters, which cover their costs through tax and advertising, 
namely have less knowledge about viewers’ preferences than pay-TV broadcasters, which can 
use price discrimination and bundling strategies. It is hard to see which market failure which 
creates the largest welfare loss. A pay-TV ban, implying that sport broadcasting have to be 
financed through advertising, is however likely to generate less income for the broadcaster. 
(Jeanrenaud and Késenne, 2006).    
 
There are other economic and political arguments in the discussion on free-to-air versus pay-
TV. The EU argues that televised sport creates positive externalities through stronger cultural 
identities and should therefore be broadcasted free to air (Jeanrenaud and Késenne, 2006). 
Since the today’s broadcasting technology is relatively new, sport has traditionally been 
broadcasted on a free-to-air broadcaster. When these sport events now are moved over to pay-
TV this also violate to what viewers are used to and expect. Paying for an event they always 
have watched for free seems wrong. Trond Giske, the minister of culture in Norway, is clear 
in his statement and expresses that politicians have a responsibility to prevent a situation 
where the consumers to a larger extent have to buy big sport experiences.4 
                                                 
4 VG: “Vil at TV-fotball vises gratis”  http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=108643 
downloaded 07.04.2008 
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2.2.4 The Historical TV-Agreement 
June 17th 2005 is a historical day in the history of the broadcasting of Tippeligaen. On that 
date the TV2 Group in cooperation with the telecom company Telenor signed a TV-
agreement with the owner of Tippeligaen, NFF. The TV-deal got a lot of attention because of 
its high value. The price was a result of competition between national and international actors 
in the media market. The TV2 Group and Telenor paid 1 billion NOK to the rights of almost 
all Norwegian football. The agreement included the exclusive rights to broadcast the 
Norwegian male top division the next three years (2006, 2007 and 2008) (Helland and Ytre-
Arne, 2007). 
 
Beside the historical high price of the TV-rights, the TV-agreement is remarkable because of 
the wide coverage of football. This is also remarkable from an international perspective: all 
matches are covered live, either on the commercial public channels TV2 and TV2Zebra or on 
subscription-TV. The two first channels are free to air channels. The subscription-TV, 
provided by the TV2 Group and Telenor, viewers are excluded by a charge of payment. The 
subscription channel had almost 20 000 subscribers the first season (2006), while the number 
more than doubled during the next season.5 As the subscribers usually can choose between 
four matches played at the same time, a match on the subscription channel does not have a 
large audience in front of the television. The audience is also relatively small, considering that 
about 98 per cent of the households which have television in Norway are able to receive 
TV2.6 The games televised on TV2 had on average over 500 000 viewers.7 The proportion 
able to receive TV2Zebra increased from about 47 per cent in the beginning of the 2006 
season to about 65 per cent at end of the 2007 season.8 The average number of viewers on the 
matches broadcasted TV2Zebra also increased from about 120 000 to 140 000 the two season 
analysed. 
 
As a rule of thumb five matches were played Sundays at 18:00 in 2006. One of these matches 
was broadcasted on TV2Zebra, the rest were broadcasted on subscription-TV. At 20:00 the 
same day “the main match” of the round was played and broadcasted on TV2. The last match 
of the round was played Mondays at 19:00 and broadcasted on TV2Zebra. The fixtures were 
                                                 
5Kampanje: “Traff målet med betal-tv-fotball” http://www.kampanje.com/medier/article164121.ece downloaded 
20.04.2008 
6 98 per cent of the households have television in Norway 
7 Birgit Eie, researcher in the market division in the TV2 Group, on e-mail 11.02.2008 
8 TNS Gallup: http://tv-research.tns-gallup.no/Kanaldistribusjon/Distribusjon.asp downloaded 28.03.2008 
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almost following the same pattern in 2007, except that one match on subscription-TV was 
moved from Sunday at 18:00 to Saturdays at 19:00. Due to public holidays and delayed 
matches both years, some rounds and matches were played other times than scheduled above. 
Moreover, the matches in the two last rounds both years were played at the same time to 
prevent speculation between the competing teams.  
 
The income from the agreement is shared among the different actors subject to a complex 
sharing model. First the income is shared between NFF and NTF. The part received by NTF is 
then divided such that 80 per cent goes to Tippeligaen and 20 per cent to the division below, 
Adeccoligaen. The sharing rule in Tippeligaen is revised every year. In 2007 the following 
sharing model was used: 50 per cent of the sum is shared equal between the competing clubs, 
20 per cent is performance based subject to the final position in the league and the last 30 per 
cent depends on which channel or platform the game is broadcasted. TV2 is weighted with 60 
per cent and TVZebra and subscription-TV is weighted with 20 per cent each. The home team 
receives 2/3, while the visiting team receives 1/3. There is also put some weight on how many 
who actually view the game on television, the TV-rating.9 This implies that a televised game 
on TV2 can generate up to 600 000 NOK for the home team and 400 000 NOK for the away 
team.10 Assuming an average admission price of 175 NOK per person, the transfer to the 
home team then corresponds to the loss of gate revenue from almost 3 500 spectators. Due to 
the complicated sharing model there is however difficult to say in general how much revenue 
a public broadcasted game generates for the involved clubs. 
 
The decision of which game to broadcast each round is a result of cooperation between three 
actors: TV2, NFF and NTF. There are no doubts that TV2, who has paid for the television 
rights, is dominant in those negotiations. The channel’s sport editor Bjørn Taalesen mentions 
four points which are of importance in the decision of which games to broadcast:11 
• Journalistic principles concerning which game that has the largest common interest, 
excitement etc. 
• Considerations in respect to the sport: who are in the championship race and who are 
fighting against relegation? 
                                                 
9 Knut Kristvang, director of TV and Media in NFF, on e-mail January 22nd 2008. 
10 Dagbladet: “TIL og Stabæk mot tap i TV krigen” http://www.dagbladet.no/sport/2007/09/18/512428.html 
downloaded 23.04.08 
11 Bjørn Taalesen, sport editor TV2, on e-mail March 10th 2008 
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• Arena - attendance (Matches on TV with high attendance are much better than 
matches with half full stadiums). 
• The round’s “biggest game” shall be broadcasted on TV2 
 
Johnsen and Solvoll (2007) argue that the public service broadcasters will maximize their 
audience. Since the majority of the viewers are club neutral, there is reasonable to believe that 
they rather want to watch games between teams that perform on a high level. The authors 
therefore assume that public service channels base their selection of games on sporting 
criterion rather than other criterions, for example criterions related to the clubs. Although the 
pattern is clearer in 2006, looking at the relationship between the amount of TV-coverage per 
team and the final league position in 2006 and 2007 respectively, we see that the top position 
teams get a wider coverage than the middle and low position teams (figure 2, figure 3). 
 
Figure2 
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Figure3 
TV-Coverage vs Final Position 2007
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3. Theory 
This chapter briefly presents the economic theory on demand in general, and the demand for 
sport in particular. The economic literature on this field has developed and increased rapidly 
over the last decades. I also present some of the literature in this section. 
 
3.1 Two Types of Demand 
In the discussion of demand for professional sports it is convenient to distinguish between two 
types of demand. Using the terminology of Borland and MacDonald (2003) those two types 
can be called direct demand and derived demand, respectively. Direct demand refers to the 
attendance that shows up at the contest and the demand for watching sporting contest on a pay 
per view basis. The latter one refers to when the sporting contest is an intermediate good used 
as an input in other goods or services. The focus in this thesis will be on direct demand. The 
discussion above about sport and the media, can however also been seen as a part of the 
derived demand concept. 
3.2 General Theory 
The existing studies on demand for sport are based on a standard consumer theory model. 
That implies the assumption of the utility maximising, rational, income constrained individual 
consumer (Downward and Dawson, 2000). 
3.2.1 Consumer Theory 
The basic idea behind the consumer theory is that a rational consumer always will choose the 
most preferred bundle of goods from a set of affordable alternatives. In the model presented 
let m be a fixed amount of money available to the consumer and let ),,( 1 kpp ⋅⋅⋅=p  be a 
vector of prices of goods. The consumer is constrained by his budget constraint, implying that 
he cannot get whatever he wants. His budget set is given by: 
.}:in  { mXB == pxx  
Formally the consumer’s maximization problem can then be represented as follows: 
X
m
)u(
in  is 
such that 
max
x
px
x
≤  
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u(x) is the consumer’s utility function and it is assumed to be convex, reflecting the 
assumption of decreasing marginal utility.12 By standard assumptions of a continuous utility 
function and a closed and bounded constraint set, there will be a solution to this problem. 
There is also convenient to assume that the preferences satisfy local non-satiation, implying 
that we can restate to problem as: 
m
u
=px
x
such that 
)(max
 
The solution x* to this problem is the consumer’s demand bundle. It can be represented in a 
figure where we for simplicity reasons assume that we have two goods, . ),( 21 xx=x
 
Figure 4 
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budget 
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x1 
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The consumer maximizes his utility when the utility function is tangent to the budget 
constraint (Varian, 1992). In the model x1 represent the good football, while x2 represent the 
sum of all other goods. An increase in prices on football, ceteris paribus, implies a steeper 
budget constraint and less consumption of football. 
 
Having the theory in mind, the admission price for a game is expected to affect the 
attendance. Assuming that live football is an ordinary good, an increase in prices will 
decrease the attendance. Most studies support that the admission price has this impact on the 
attendance. There are difficulties, however, in measuring the price and this may alter the 
result in an analysis. The clubs normally operate with different price categories: season 
tickets, short side vs. long side stand, lower vs. upper tier, standing section, membership 
                                                 
12 By perfect substitutes or complements the utility function is assumed to be straight lines or L-shaped, 
respectively. 
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reduction etc. It is hard to find a proper way to implement all these categories in a demand 
model, especially when the price categories differ between the clubs. In their study of the 
English Premier League Baimbridge et al. (1996) use for example “the average price derived 
from unweighted nominal tickets prices for each game together with season tickets prices, 
weighted in relation to the number of such tickets”. They find that ticket price has a 
significant negative impact on attendance, but they point out that previous studies have both 
resulted in positive and negative influences on the attendance using this price variable. 
3.2.2 Normal versus Inferior Good 
There has been some disagreement whether football is normal or an inferior good among 
those who have studied the demand for the sport. In this section I will briefly explain the two 
concepts. First, a normal good describes the case of an increase (a decrease) in consumption 
of the good as income increases (decreases). This can be illustrated with an extension of 
figure 4: 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
x1 
x2 
An increase in income implies an outward shift in the budget constraint. The tangential points 
which then arise are known as the income expansion path when a line is drawn between them. 
The function is called the Engel Curve. Second, in contrast to the normal good, the inferior 
good do not increase in consumption as income increases. The income expansion path then 
bends backward as shown in figure 6. We see that the consumer actually consume less of one 
of the goods (Varian, 1992). 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
x1 
x2 
In the figures above we can assume that x1 is football and x2 a random other good or simply 
rest of other consumption goods. 
 
Many studies include macroeconomic variables, such as income and unemployment rate in a 
club’s catchment area. Baimbridge et al. (1996) expects that the unemployment rate has a 
negative effect on the attendance, but the analysis concludes the opposite. Falter and Pérignon 
(2000) discover the same relationship in French football. This suggests that football is an 
inferior good. The income variable in other studies suggests however that football is a normal 
good. In their investigation of whether football is a normal or an inferior good, Forrest et al 
(2003) conclude that English Premiership football is a normal good. This is also in line with 
García and Rodríguez (2002) analysing the Spanish Primera Division. I also find it reasonable 
to assume that Tippeligaen is a normal good. 
3.3 Determinants of Attendance 
The main aim of this thesis is to find the impact of public broadcasted matches on the stadium 
attendances. There are however numerous circumstances outside the model presented above, 
which are reasonable to believe have an impact on the attendance. In this section I present the 
economic literature on the demand for sport and other relevant economic contributions. I 
briefly discuss it and try to relate it to the case of Tippeligaen. In line with Borland and 
MacDonald (2003) I have divided the determinants into five different categories. In contrast 
to the authors I treat the impact of Broadcasting as a sixth category instead of an economic 
variable. The categories are: 
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• Preferences 
• Economic Variables 
• Quality of Viewing 
• Uncertainty of Outcome 
• Capacity Constraints 
• The Impact of Broadcasting 
3.3.1 Preferences 
Consumer preferences in the demand for football are in many ways equal to those for a 
consumer who consume other types of goods or services. That implies that utility are 
increasing with a decreasing rate with the quantity consumed. There are however reasons to 
believe that preferences may be a little bit more complex. This complexity can be related to 
three concepts: “Habit”, “conspicuous consumption” and “bandwagon effects”. Only the first 
one has got attention in economic demand for sport literature (Borland and MacDonald, 
2003). I will in the following shortly outline the three concepts. 
 
The habit hypothesis refers to (i) that the current preferences and demand are influenced by 
past consumption preferences and (ii) that higher consumption of a good in the past implies, 
ceteris paribus, higher present consumption of the same good (Pollak, 1970). In a demand for 
football model the present attendance will then influence the current attendance. This effect 
can be interpreted as fan loyalty. This fan loyalty can very much also be interpreted as what 
Becker and Murphy (1988) call addiction. They point out that people do not only get addicted 
to cocaine, alcohol and cigarettes, but also to any other activities such as work and music. An 
addicted individual may not act rational. A football fan which is addicted to football is 
therefore excluded from the rational choice framework. The authors include however 
addiction in the model of rationality. 
 
The Norwegian-American economist Torstein Veblen (1899) introduced the concept of 
conspicuous consumption in his well known book “The Theory of the Leisure Class”. 
Conspicuous consumption is therefore also referred to as the Veblen effect and captures the 
case of an increased demand of a good when the price is high rather than low. This is in 
conflict with rationality, but the conspicuous consumer want, from a sociological point of 
view, show some kind of a status by paying more rather than less. In everyday language this is 
formulated in the phrase “Keeping up with the Joneses.” (Leibenstein, 1950). There are no 
  
17 
reasons to expect that the Veblen effect is widespread among consumers of football. 
Traditionally football is a working class sport, and the working class has not been a typical 
exponent of “keeping up with the Joneses”. The last decade, however, has football also 
become popular among the financial elite and what is considered as the upper class of the 
society. New stadiums with exclusive VIP lounges may have increased the cases of 
conspicuous consumption in Norway as well as in other European football leagues. 
 
The bandwagon effect reflects the case when a consumer will demand more (less) of a 
commodity at a given price because some or all other individuals in the market also demand 
more (less) of the commodity (Leibenstein, 1950). Translating this into the world of football, 
this mean that attendance by one fan, increases the value of attendance for other fans. A 
football fan is then not only engaged in what actually happens on the field, but he also has 
some preferences to what is going on in the stands. There are reasonable to believe that there 
exists some degree of a bandwagon effect in the demand for football and that the atmosphere 
in a sold out stadium is preferred to the atmosphere in a half empty one by the attendees.  
3.3.2 Economic Variables 
The problem of defining good price variables and the ambiguous results from different studies 
are already presented in section 3.2.1. In respect to this, some economists argue to leave 
admission price outside the demand model. Peel and Thomas (1992) and Falter and Pérignon 
(2000) are among those. They also base their argument on the fact that the admission price is 
an endogen variable, a result of several prior interactions between the demand and supply of 
football. 
 
Using the admission price is, however, somehow not sufficient in measuring the consumer’s 
cost of attending the game. As economists we are more interested in the opportunity costs. An 
important component in measuring this cost is the travelling cost, both money and time, of the 
away supporters. A normal implementation of opportunity costs in demand for sport studies is 
therefore to introduce a variable which measure the distance between the clubs. This is a 
fairly good measure for the opportunity cost although it can in some cases be cheaper to travel 
a route, which may is longer in kilometres than an alternative route.  
 
Another important economic variable which is expected to have an impact on the attendance 
is the market size. How many possible buyers of a match ticket are there? A common used 
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measure for market size is population. The questions which then arise are: What population is 
appropriate to use for the respective clubs? What is the club’s catchment area?  Hart et al. 
(1975) used data on the male population in the urban parliamentary constituencies 
surrounding the club grounds. Thus, they assume that the attendance mainly consists of men. 
Although the majority of the attendance in Tippeligaen is men, there are a considerable 
proportion of women. To use the male population as a measure of market size is then not 
sufficient. Most studies do however not divide the population between the sexes, but they 
differ in the way they define the catchment area. Forrest et al. (2002) found that most of the 
attendees lived within 10 miles of the stadium and they argue that those who live near the 
place in question may feel more affinity to the club than those living further away. This also 
sounds reasonable in Norway, but there are probably differences between the clubs. In Oslo, 
for example, there are two clubs, Vålerenga and FC Lyn, which share market size. Rosenborg, 
on the other hand, has in many ways become the club of their county not only the city of 
Trondheim. In other words, using the population as a measurement is a simplification 
independent of how it is measured. 
3.3.3 Quality of Viewing 
The quality of viewing category captures variables such as the stadium facilities, weather and 
timing. Starting with the stadium facilities; there has been a major development in the 
stadiums in Europe the last decade as a result of an increased focus on security after tragedies 
such as the Heysel disaster in 1985 and an increased problem with hooliganism. UEFA has 
clearly defined criterions on the quality of the stadiums used in their tournaments. NFF has 
followed the strict rules.13 Although the criterions are clearly defined and no one has any 
reasons to fear security problems in the Norwegian football stadiums, the stadium facilities 
differ between the stadiums and on each stadium. The demand for football may change in 
respect to those facilities. 
 
The hypothesis suggests that a new stadium increases attendance, also called the novelty effect 
in economic literature. The fact that the Norwegian stadiums the last years have improved and 
attendance has risen builds up on this hypothesis. Economists in Europe have apparently not 
focused on this in their analysis of demand for sports; while the Americans have worked a 
little bit more on this in the studies of Major League Baseball. They find that the age of the 
stadium has a negative effect on attendance (Depken, 2000). 
                                                 
13NFF: Norsk Klubblisens versjon 2.0 
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Another “quality of viewing” variable is timing. This implies the impact of which time of the 
year, week and day the contest takes place. The timing is important in the sense that it 
influences the opportunity cost. If the contest or game takes place at a time when something 
more valuable happens from the consumer’s point of view, the opportunity cost will increase 
and attendance decrease. The literature is quite clear about this (Borland and MacDonald, 
2003). Considering the role of the opportunity cost, Forrest and Simmons (2006) finds that the 
lower divisions’ attendance in the English league suffers from the broadcast of midweek 
Champions League matches. The schedule of Tippeligaen takes the role of the opportunity 
cost into account. Even though Norway did not take part in the world cup in Germany in 2006 
and only a handful of players in Tippeligaen took part representing their respective countries, 
the league had a break during the championship. The next season, in 2007 when no 
international tournament took place, the break was in July when most employees in Norway 
are on vacation, which would lead to an expectation in lower attendance. 
 
The last “quality of viewing” variable which is supposed to have some sort of impact on the 
attendance is the weather conditions. Temperature and precipitation may have an impact of 
how comfortable the spectator finds it on the stands. Clearly, the improvements of the 
stadiums have made it less volatile concerning the weather conditions. In a modern stadium 
there are ceilings above the stands and the spectators do not get wet from rainfall. The 
literature conveys different results on the impact of the weather conditions in respect to which 
sports which are in question and where the contest takes place (Borland and MacDonald, 
2003). In the case of football Baimbridge et al (1996) find no significant impact from 
precipitation and wind in the English Premiership, while García and Rodríguez (2002) find 
that poor weather conditions reduces attendance significantly in Spain. The different 
conclusion from England and Spain may is a result of cultural differences. England has 
definitely another climate than Spain and the respective populations may therefore react on 
poor weather differently. Such differences may also be the case inside Norway. Bergen is well 
known for the poor weather conditions and therefore the fans of SK Brann may not react on 
precipitation the same way as those who would like to attend matches in the area of Oslo.  
3.3.4 Uncertainty of Outcome 
The determinant uncertainty of outcome or competitive balance is perhaps the must discussed 
topic in the demand for sport literature and economic sport literature in general. Rottenberg 
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(1956) was the first one to claim that games had to have some degree of uncertainty if the 
consumers should be willing to pay the admission price. This uncertainty does not only 
generate increased attendance at teams own games, but makes the whole league more 
interesting and attendance will increase in other games as well. In other words there is an 
externality. Neale (1964) gives in his classic article “The Peculiar Economics of Professional 
Sport” the hypothesis a name, the Louis-Schmelling Paradox. This paradox refers to the two 
heavy weight boxers Joe Louis and Max Schmelling competing for the world championship in 
the 1930’s. With this paradox Neale confronts the monopoly theory that a firm is better off 
and earns higher profit if it is the sole supplier of a product. Considering, however, the 
situation of the world heavy weight champion, there is more profitable if there is some 
competition. If the heavy weight champion wants to maximize his profit he obviously needs a 
contender. The prize money will even rise the stronger the contender is. 
 
Pure monopoly is disaster: Joe Luis would have no one to fight and therefore no income (Neale, 1964) 
 
Although it is obvious that an athlete or a team needs a contender and monopoly is not 
preferable, it is more doubtful whether a sporting league or an association prefer a free market 
situation. Imagine for example a situation where there are two professional football leagues in 
one country. Probably one of the leagues would go bankrupt and a natural monopoly situation 
would soon arise. There are however a few examples that professional sport associations can 
compete against each other. In the professional boxing world there are three equal 
associations (WBA, WBC, IBF) and among the fighters it is prestigious to win all of them. 
  
It is obviously no problem to implement the Louis-Schmelling Paradox in any other sport than 
boxing. Almost every study in demand for sport has some sort of variable measuring the 
uncertainty of outcome. The hypothesis predicts that uncertainty has a positive impact on 
demand. There is however widely discussed how to measure uncertainty, but there seem to be 
no strong agreements among sport economists though. It is convenient to distinguish between 
two types that occur subject to a sporting league; (1) Match outcome uncertainty and (2) 
seasonal uncertainty of outcome. 
 
Match uncertainty refers to the uncertainty of a specific match. There are two dominating 
approaches to this type of uncertainty (Downward and Dawson, 2005). First, some use a 
measure of difference in winning percentage or league ranking of teams, a performance based 
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measurement. Information about the teams’ performance within the current season is 
explicitly accounted for. Second, a measure of probability derived from betting odds. Peel and 
Thomas (1988) used fixed betting odds in their study. They argue that if the market of fixed 
odds betting is efficient, then odds posted for various outcomes of a match will be unbiased 
predictions of the outcome. The betting odds also fully reflect the available information when 
the odds are set. One critical argument of using betting odds has been that many studies show 
that the fixed odds offered by bookmakers is not efficient, the betting markets may be biased. 
Another argument is that betting odds really measure the probability of home win and not 
uncertainty of outcome (Downward and Dawson, 2005). Considering match outcome 
uncertainty, there are no clear evidence on acceptance of the hypothesis that uncertainty has a 
positive influence on attendance. Some studies have even shown the opposite (Borland and 
MacDonald, 2003) 
 
Seasonal uncertainty of outcome reflects the position of the team in reference to the 
possibilities of winning the championship or the possibilities of promotion/relegation. In other 
words it refers to the closeness of a competition. Jennet (1984) has introduced a complex 
model of this type of uncertainty which is used in other studies. He points out that the 
attendance not only is determined by the uncertainty related to a specific match, but to the 
uncertainty of the league’s final outcome and the race for the championship. The complexity 
of this issue arrives because this kind of uncertainty is more important in the end of the season 
than in the beginning. In Jennet’s model there are two important uncertainty factors to 
determine whether the supporter will go to the match or not: (1) is the team in a position of 
winning the championship or in a possibility of relegation? (2) The number of remaining 
games in the season. The main critique of this model is that it is impossible to know how 
many points that are needed to secure the championship or avoid relegation. In Jennet’s model 
the uncertainty is therefore calculated ex post at the end of the season. 
 
Another such ex post measurement of uncertainty of championship outcome is introduced by 
Janssens and Késenne (1987) and represented in Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002). They 
construct the following index: 
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c corresponds to the points needed to win the championship, b is the current number of points 
the team has and t is the number of games played. m is the maximum number of points a team 
can collect during the season. Thus, the variable U takes the value zero at the stage a team 
does not have a theoretical chance of winning the season anymore. If the league champion has 
the required number of points before all their matches have been played, we see that U is not 
defined, the denominator is zero. The authors do not discuss this case. Anyway, this will 
eventually happen to very few games in a sample, so setting a default value equal to 100, 
should not alter the result. This value corresponds to the case when a team only need one 
point to win the championship. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the end of the domination of Rosenborg’s position in Norway 
has increased the uncertainty of who is going to be the winner of Tippeligaen. That other 
teams are able bring the league trophy back home may have had a positive influence on the 
attendances. 
 
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) also present a variable which hardly can be considered as an 
uncertainty variable. They call the variable reputation and it captures the fact that some teams 
have a tradition and history which is thought to have an impact on the attendance. This seems 
plausible also in the case of Norway: Rosenborg’s domination in Tippeligaen by winning 13 
championships in a row has made it very prestigious for their opponents to beat them. The 
Reputation variable is defined: 
 
∑
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xt is the team’s final ranking t seasons ago. n is the total number of teams in Tippeligaen and 
Adeccoligaen. The weighting of the rankings over the years considered, reflects the 
depreciating effect on a team’s reputation. The variable takes a higher variable the better 
reputation the team has. I have modified the model to fit into the Norwegian case. First, as 
mentioned, I have considered Tippeligaen and Adeccoligaen as one league, implying that in 
this formula number one in Adeccoligaen corresponds to a hypothetical number fifteen in 
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Tippeligaen, number two corresponds to number sixteen etc. Second, I have set T=9.14 This is 
convenient because before the 1997 season, the level under the premiership division was 
divided into two leagues subject to geographical placement of the teams. This makes it 
difficult to implement earlier seasons in the model. Third, if a team did not play continuously 
in the two top divisions the seasons considered, the sum is set to zero. 
3.3.5 Capacity Constraints 
A stadium’s capacity reflects the supply of the sport. Many studies have ignored the fact that 
the stadiums might be sold out. In such cases it is hard to measure the real demand for the 
sport, and we need to take into account that the variable is truncated. (Borland and 
MacDonald, 2003. Kennedy, 2003) In the case of Tippeligaen only a very small proportion of 
the games are sold out, so the problem will not play a crucial role in an analysis (see section 
4.1.5). 
3.3.6 The Impact of Broadcasting 
Live coverage of football on television is probably the best alternative to actually showing up 
on the match if one wants to see a game. There are therefore surprisingly few studies on the 
impact of broadcasting, although the clubs often claim that they lose gate revenue when the 
games are broadcasted. The few studies on the impact of broadcasting on sport attendance are 
somewhat ambiguous. The studies from England find that live broadcasts either have a 
significant negative or zero effect (Borland and MacDonald, 2003). Baimbridge et al. (1996) 
conclude that the live coverage of the English Premier League matches in the weekends have 
no significant impact on the attendance. The matches broadcasted on Mondays experienced 
however a decline in the attendance. In the study of the Spanish Primera Division, García and 
Rodríguez (2002) find that broadcasting has a negative impact independently of the timing of 
the game. They point out that the effect is larger if the game is shown on a public channel 
where everybody has free access contrary to the situation where the game is shown on a 
subscription based channel. Falter and Pérignon (2000) find in their study of the French 
football league, no significant impact of broadcasting. They argue, however, that the reason is 
that broadcasted matches are all shown on a pay-TV channel. 
 
When broadcasting of matches has a negative impact on the attendance there is a reason to 
claim that “couch viewing” is a substitute for actually showing up at the match. There are 
                                                 
14 Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) have set T=20, but they also point out that setting T=6 does not harm their 
results. 
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however studies, which show that live broadcast of sport events has a positive impact on 
attendance. In other words that a live broadcasted sport event is a compliment to the good 
offered at the stadium. These studies are mostly linked to US sports such as Baseball and 
American football. Borland and MacDonald (2003) discuss these studies. They also conclude 
that most studies suggest a negative impact of broadcasting on attendance on sporting contests 
and that there is impossible on the ground of existing empirical evidence to support a positive 
relationship. Further, they argue: 
 
Live broadcast of a match may decrease attendance at that match, but nevertheless stimulate interest in 
the sporting competition in a way that increases total attendance. (Borland and MacDonald, 2003) 
 
Having figure1 in mind it is tempting to transfer the above argument into the issue of 
broadcast and attendance in Norwegian professional football. This argument also is logic, 
because it is important for the companies which buy the sporting contest that their investment 
pays off. If the product (in this case Tippeligaen), dramatically change by a decline in 
attendance, the TV-viewers and sponsors may not be interested in the televised product 
anymore. It is therefore in the interest of the broadcaster to maintain or even increase the 
attendance. Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) argue in this direction when they find a positive 
relationship between broadcasting and attendance in their analysis of the German Bundesliga. 
They further conclude that they have to drop the TV variable because the TV-stations and 
stadium spectators based their demand on the same variables, a specification error occur. 
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4. Construction of the Data Set 
In this section I present the data used in my analysis of demand for Norwegian top division 
football. 
4.1 Football Statistics 
Several newspapers and websites provide typical match facts of games played. The quality 
and credibility vary however substantially. Two websites are however sovereign in respect to 
the two requirements. The first one is the RSSSF Archive, available at www.rsssf.com.15 The 
second website which delivers quality data is www.nifs.no. The website is provided by the 
newspaper BA (Bergensavisen) in cooperation with Neco data. I use both sources when 
collecting the football specific variables of interest, namely attendance, the teams’ points and 
positions during the season, the teams’ history when calculating reputation and the point of 
time the games are played. Data on which games that are broadcasted live on public channels 
are provided by TV2 on enquiry. 
4.2 Uncertainty of Outcome 
In my model I will both control for match outcome uncertainty and seasonal uncertainty of 
outcome. Starting with the uncertainty related to the match outcome I will use betting odds 
from Norsk Tipping AS16 which provide odds on every premiership games. 
 
As discussed above the odds reflect the probabilities of the three outcomes in a game; home 
win, draw and away win. The odds are however not expressed as probabilities as we know 
them from the teaching book of statistics and the betting company also sets a margin to make 
the business profitable. Consider the following example: 
 
From the opening game of the 2006 season between the rivals Lillestrøm and Rosenborg 
Norsk Tipping offered the respective odds: 2.30 3.10 2.40. This implies that the gambler 
receives 2.30 times his investment if Lillestrøm wins (H), 3.10 times his investment if the 
game ends with a draw (D), and 2.40 times his investment if Roseborg wins (A). The first step 
                                                 
15 RSSSF was founded 1994 under the name NERSSSF (Northern European Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics 
Foundation) 
16 Norsk Tipping AS is a joint-stock company 100% owned by the Norwegian government. 
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of the calculation of the probabilities of every three outcomes is to calculate the bookmaker’s 
profit index (PI): 
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1
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1
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1
AoddsDoddsHodds
PI ++=     (4.1) 
 
In our example the profit index is 1.174. The profit index varies between 1.173 and 1.180 in 
my data set. The second step of the calculation is to find the bookmaker’s payout ratio. 
Assuming that the bookmaker receives the right share of bets on each outcome, the payout 
ratio (PR) is: 
 
PI
PR 1%100 ⋅=        (4.2) 
 
In our case the payout ratio is 85 per cent, implying that Norsk Tipping pays out 85 per cent 
of the gambler’s stake. Now we can, in the third and last step, calculate the probabilities the 
bookmaker thinks reflect the outcome uncertainty of the particular game: 
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In our example this implies that Norsk Tipping means that there is 37.0% chance of a home 
win, 27.5% chance of the game ending with a draw, and 35.5% chance of an away win. 
 
As a measure of seasonal outcome I have used the model from Czarnitzki and Stadtmann 
(2002) presented in section 3.3.4. 
4.3 Population and Distance Statistics 
As discussed above there are various ways of measuring a club’s market share. I have simply 
used the population on January 1st 2007 in the municipality the respective clubs belong to. 
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These data are provided by Statistics Norway. Even though I analyse the 2006 and 2007 
season the population do not vary significantly over such a short period, so this single census 
is sufficient. One could however have considered better ways to measure the away clubs’ 
market size. The club Stabæk comes from the fourth most populated municipality, but has on 
their home games the lowest average attendance over the two seasons analysed. That also 
includes lower average than the four clubs playing one of the two seasons in the 1.division. 
As already mentioned, there is one city which hosts two clubs in Norway. The capital Oslo 
consists of the west side club FC Lyn and the east side club Vålerenga. The latter one has 
undoubtedly had a larger market size the recent decades than FC Lyn, and is on a fourth place 
on the average attendance list the two seasons considered. FC Lyn is on an eighth place on the 
same list. In my analysis I divide the population of Oslo equal between the two clubs. 
Considering the average attendance list and the fact that Oslo also has clubs in lower divisions 
which share the market with the two top clubs, such a split of the market size is definitely a 
simplification. The population effect for the home teams are captured by a fixed effect in the 
model presented in chapter 5, but a measure on population is still relevant for the visiting 
team. 
 
There are not that many ways to measure the distance between the clubs as there are ways to 
measure the market size, so this should be more or less straight forward. I have used the 
shortest route on the public highway as a measurement for distance between the clubs. These 
data are provided by the Norwegian Directorate of Public Roads (Vegdirektoratet). Since 
distance represents the opportunity cost of travelling to an away game, it can be argued that 
using distance on public roads in some cases may not is the right measurement. As low cost 
aeroplane companies have entered the market, aeroplane tickets on some flights have become 
really cheap. Since the leagues fixtures are published in December, a supporter who then 
orders aeroplane tickets will probably get that cheap.17 If he also lives nearby the airport, the 
opportunity cost may be lower than using the public roads. In most cases, however, the lowest 
opportunity cost is reflected in the measurement I have used. 
4.4 Weather Statistics 
Collecting weather statistics from each game played in the 2006 and 2007 season is not that 
easy. Such data are not published in the typical match facts provided by the newspapers etc. 
                                                 
17 The supporter risks in this case that the game will be rescheduled. This risk has to be included in the 
calculation of opportunity costs. 
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The Norwegian Meteorological Institute, a public weather service, has observed the weather 
in Norway for over a hundred years.18 The observations are registered on the different 
weather stations that the institute has. These stations are of course not situated on the 
respective clubs’ arenas, but I have used the observations on the nearest station to each 
stadium. I have used the temperature registered in closeness to the time each game is played. 
Considering precipitation, the data available vary from weather station to weather station. 
Some stations register precipitation many times a day, while other only does it ones a day. I 
have used the registered precipitation the last 24 hours, that implies precipitation from 07 a.m. 
at the match day to 07 a.m. the day after. Table B1 in appendix B shows which weather 
station I have used for each club. 
4.5 Capacity Constraints 
The respective teams in the sample have a capacity constraint on their stadium. There is 
however difficult to identify which games are sold out, because some matches have a higher 
attendance than the official capacity on the stadium. I have simply ignored the problems 
related to capacity constraints, because it plays such a small role in the Norwegian case. One 
should however have in mind that this may creates a downward bias in the results (Kennedy, 
2003). All in all there are relatively few games, about 6.5 per cent, which have a higher or 
equal attendance to the official capacity. 
                                                 
18 The statistics are available on http://eklima.met.no 
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5. The Econometric Framework 
The main goal of this thesis is to find out whether live television of football on a public 
broadcaster has an impact on the stadium attendance. I will in this section first introduce the 
ordinary least square estimator (OLS), before I present the model and the results. 
5.1 The Ordinary Least Square Estimator 
Using the OLS method is convenient because of its properties. In the justification for that I 
will start presenting the five assumptions of an OLS estimator. Throughout this section I will 
also exemplify this theory using a simple classical linear regression model (CLR): 
 
iii XY εββ ++= 10       ni ,...,1=     (5.1) 
 
where we assume that ATTY ln=  is the dependent variable, logarithm of attendance. Y 
depends on the independent variable TVX = , a dummy variable which take the value 1 if the 
game is televised on a public broadcaster. β0 is the model’s constant term and β1 is the 
coefficient of X saying how much Y changes if the game is televised. εi is the model’s 
disturbance term (error term) capturing all the determinants of y which are not observed. 
 
The five assumptions of the CLR model and the OLS estimator are as follows: 
1. The dependent variable is a linear function of a set of independent variables and a 
disturbance term, just as in the above paragraph. 
2. The expectation of the disturbance term is zero: 0)( =iE ε  
3. The disturbance terms all have the same variance:   2)var( σε =i
4. Zero covariance between any random pair of disturbance terms: 0),cov( =ji εε  This 
implies that that the values of Yi are statistically independent. 
5. The number of observations has to exceed the number of independent variables and 
there cannot be any perfect linear relationship between the independent variables. 
 
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that under the assumptions 1-5, the least squares 
estimators, among unbiased linear estimators, have minimum variance. We say that they are 
best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) (Kennedy, 2003. Gujarati, 1995. Hill et al, 2001). 
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5.2 Model Specification 
The simple regression model presented in the above section may create biased estimates as 
there is reasonable to believe that assumption 1-5 is not fulfilled. TV is not assumed to be the 
single determinant of attendance, leading us to an omitted variable problem, 
implying 0)( ≠iE ε . To estimate the impact of public broadcasting of matches on attendance 
one therefore also has to control for other effects such that 0)( =controlsE iε . Assuming this 
and that the remaining assumptions in section 5.1 still are a valid specification allowing for 
differential effects on the public channels, the model with full set of controls can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
itititititit ZEBRAMONZEBRASUNTVATT εηγββββ ++++++= C3210 2ln  (5.2) 
 
ηit denote the home team season fixed effects that control for all factors that are home team 
specific and home team-season specific. C is a vector specifying the set of control variables. 
Furthermore we then assume that 0),( =ititE ηε C  and that the assumptions 1-5 are fulfilled. 
 
Specifying the model such that team*season effects are taken into account helps us control for 
the home teams’ specific characteristics. Among those characteristics are market size, 
admission price, macroeconomic factors, reputation, fan loyalty etc. The model also allows 
for different fixed team effects each season, such that potentially changes in stadium facilities 
from the 2006 to the 2007 season. 
 
The logarithm of attendance is (log ATT) is the dependent variable and β0 is the model’s 
constant term. In the model, which I am about to explain, all categories of variables discussed 
in chapter 3 are included. 
 
The first three variables are three dummy variables reflecting whether a game was 
broadcasted live on a public channel or not. TV2 takes the value one if a game was 
broadcasted on TV2. ZEBRASUN takes the value one if a game is broadcasted on TV2Zebra 
on a Sunday or on a day where the majority of the round’s games are played exactly at the 
same time as the game televised on the channel. ZEBRAMON reflects the game broadcasted 
on TV2Zebra on Mondays or at a time when no other games in the league are played. The 
subscription based channel act as the reference variable. As we assume that watching a game 
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on television is a substitute to show up on the stadium, the coefficients β1, β2 and β3 are 
expected to be negative. In the model I have not taken into account that the proportion of 
people that are able to receive the TV2Zebra has risen with almost 20 per cent points. 
 
As there is reasonable to believe that television is not the single determinant of the stadium 
attendance, the remaining variables in the model control for other time varying effects which 
are thought to have an impact on the number of supporters showing up on a game. These 
variables are captured in the vector C and include all categories of variables presented in 
chapter 3. The γ is the variables’ set of parameters. The rest of this section presents the 
different variables included in the vector C. 
 
The variable ( )ln(
DIST
POPA ) is an economic variable which captures the opportunity cost of 
attending a game for the away supporters. It is formulated as the logarithm of the away team’s 
population divided by the distance between the two teams. This variable is expected to be 
positive, implying that the away team’s population has a positive impact on attendance, while 
the distance has a negative impact. The interpretation of the coefficient can then be 
formulated as a one per cent increase in
DIST
POPA , implies a γi per cent increase in attendance. 
For the four clubs situated in the area in and round Oslo, the distance is set to one.19 This 
captures potential derby effects.   
 
The next seven variables in the model are all different ways to measure match and seasonal 
uncertainty. The two first ones (POSH and POSA) are the home and away teams’ current 
position before the game is played. Those are both expected to be negative, implying that 
teams fighting for the top positions attract more audience. The two first rounds of the season 
the values take the last season’s final position. The two promoted teams take the values 15 
and 16 as if Addecoligaen was a continuation of Tippeligaen. Further are the two variables 
(PH) and (PHSQ) supposed to capture the match uncertainty and are the probability of home 
wins, calculated as described in section 4.1.2. The probability is expected to be negative 
subject to the hypothesis that the match’s closeness has a positive impact on attendance. The 
squared probability captures the likely quadratic relationship between attendance and 
uncertainty of outcome, thus this coefficient is expected to be positive. (UH) and (UA) are the 
                                                 
19 The four clubs are: FC Lyn, Vålerenga, Lillestrøm SK, Stabæk 
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seasonal uncertainties as described in section 3.3.4. They are expected to have a positive 
relationship to attendance. In the data set, there is one observation where the denominator of 
U is zero. As argued above I have set this observation equal 100. Setting different values do 
not alter the results. There is reasonable to believe that matches are more exiting as the league 
goes towards its end. A trend variable (PLAYED), which measures the amount of games the 
home team has played, is then supposed to be positive. The model also includes the reputation 
variable for the away team, (REPA), where the teams’ performance the last nine years is taken 
into account. As explained above, this takes higher value the better reputation the team has, 
implying that the variable’s expected coefficient is positive. The interpretation of these 
coefficient is a unit change in the variable, implies a γi per cent change in attendance. 
 
Besides (PLAYED), which also can be considered as a “quality of viewing variable”, two 
dummy variables are included in the model reflecting the day of the week the game is played. 
Here I have treated Sundays and public holidays as equal days and the variable is reference to 
the two dummy variables Saturday (SAT) and Weekday (WEEK). Both coefficients are 
expected to be negative, because Sunday is traditionally the “day of football” in Norway. 
Thus, games played on days deviating from Sundays, the potential audience has a higher 
opportunity cost. (16MAY) captures the effect of the traditional round played May 16th every 
season. The day before the Norwegian national day is considered to be the national day of 
Norwegian football. The next five variables (MAY, JUNE/JULY, AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, 
OCT/NOV) are all dummy variables reflecting which month a game is played. The opening 
month April acts as reference variable. The two summer month June and July are treated as 
one month since the league took its holiday in July in the 2006 season and in June in the 2007 
season. October and November are also one variable as only the last round of the respective 
seasons is played in November. As the league goes towards its end I expect positive 
coefficients on the last months. 
    
(COLD) and (RAIN) are two dummy variables reflecting the weather. (COLD) takes the 
value 1 if it colder than 10ºC and (RAIN) the same value if there has been falling more than 
10mm the 24 hours considered. Using more than 10mm has a limit also raises the probability 
of precipitation when the match is actually played. 
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model are presented in table 1, while 
descriptive statistics on each home team are presented in table 2. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics All Games 2006-2007 
 
 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min max 
ATT 364 9812.2 4986.1 2563 22330 
TV2 364 0.14560 0.35319 0 1 
TV2ZEBRASUN 364 0.13462 0.34178 0 1 
TV2ZEBRAMON 364 0.13736 0.34470 0 1 
POSH 364 7.6621 4.0985 1 16 
POSA 364 7.3819 4.0581 1 16 
PH 364 0.43784 0.10788 0,18911 0.73892 
PHSQ 364 0.20331 0.10006 0,03576 0.54600 
UH 364 1.8824 3.1459 0 33.33333 
UA 364 2.672 9.2058 0 100 
PLAYED 364 12.495 7.5067 0 25 
REPA 364 24.739 23.789 0 120.8307 
SAT 364 0.11264 0.31658 0 1 
WEEK 364 0.20055 0.40096 0 1 
16MAY 364 0.038462 0.19257 0 1 
MAY 364 0.19231 0.39466 0 1 
JUNE/JULY 364 0.22527 0.41834 0 1 
AUGUST 364 0.12088 0.32644 0 1 
SEPTEMBER 364 0.13187 0.33881 0 1 
OCT/NOV 364 0.17582 0.38119 0 1 
COLD 364 0.28022 0.32644 0 1 
RAIN 364 0.12088 0.44972 0 1 
POPA 364 114725 85598 24254 274309 
DIST 364 524.06 517.06 1 1990 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Home Teams 
 Club No. Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Rosenborg BK 26 19672 1804.3 15897 22330 
SK Brann 26 16991 1166.1 13738 19254 
Viking 26 14879 1552.2 11351 16600 
Vålerenga 26 13855 3652.7 8457 20703 
Aalesund FK 13 10125 1271.8 6012 10780 
Fredrikstad FK 26 9908 2107.2 6342 12800 
IK Start 26 9444 2259.6 6116 14448 
Lillestrøm SK 26 8817 1730.6 6205 11610 
FC Lyn 26 7652 4051.2 2563 20152 
Strømsgodset 13 6808 934.0 5347 8198 
Molde FK 13 6227 1309.8 4351 9215 
Sandefjord 26 5710 1187.0 3722 8103 
HamKam 13 5506 1030.7 4082 8063 
Tromsø 26 5561 1062.4 4007 7764 
Odd Grenland 26 5276 1082.5 4021 9022 
Stabæk 26 5275 904.2 3917 6907 
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Looking first on the minimum and maximum attendance we see that the attendance varies 
considerably across the two seasons analysed. That there is such a variation in the number of 
spectators, justifies an analysis on the demand for the sport. Considering for example the 
average attendance on the games played May 16th, the number of spectators is on average 
almost 3000 higher. The attendance also varies remarkably between teams, indicating that 
which team playing on own ground is of importance. 
 
When it comes to the day of the week the game is played, about 11 per cent of the games were 
played on Saturdays, 20 per cent were played on Mondays to Fridays, and the remaining 69 
per cent of the games on Sundays or public holidays. 
 
152 games were covered live on the two public channels the two seasons analysed and 
TV2Zebra broadcasted almost twice as many games as TV2. 49 games fall under the category 
of ZEBRASUN, while 50 games fall under the category of ZEBRAMON. Among all public 
televised games about 12 per cent were between teams in top four positions and in about 56 
per cent of the games one of the playing teams was among the top four. In other words was 68 
per cent of the public televised games involving teams fighting for the league trophy. Looking 
at the bottom part of the league table, about 6 per cent of the games broadcasted live were 
between teams in the four lowest positions, while 47 per cent involved one of the teams 
fighting against relegation. The interpretation of these descriptive statistics on public televised 
games should however be taken with a pinch of salt, because of teams’ better chances of 
improving their league position at the beginning of the season. Anyway, the data shows that 
the teams’ current positions are of importance in the TV-station’s choice of which games to 
broadcast. 
 
The average temperature the two seasons considered was 12.7ºC, while there were 102 
observations where the temperature was lower than 10ºC. The average precipitation was 3.4 
millimetre. It was registered precipitation on 213 match days, and the average rainfall those 
days was 5.9 millimetres. There are 85 observations where the precipitation is more than 5 
millimetres and 44 observations on more than 10 millimetres. 9 of those 44 observations are 
from Bergen, well known for its heavy rainfalls. 
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Among the sixteen clubs in the data set four clubs received a value zero on the reputation 
(REPA) variable, implying that four clubs did not play continuously in the two top divisions 
from 1997. Rosenborg both years has the maximum value of the variable, which is not 
surprising when we know how they have dominated the Norwegian league football.   
 
The clubs’ market size also varies a lot. HamKam, situated in the town Hamar, has the lowest 
population, while the two clubs in Oslo both has the largest market size even though the city’s 
population is divided between the two teams. The distance variable is maximized between the 
two clubs Tromsø IL and Viking. 
 
Four of the teams only have 13 home games in the data set. HamKam and Molde FK 
relegated from Tippeligaen after the 2006 season, while Aalesund FK and Strømsgodset 
replaced the two teams in the 2007 season after they promoted from Adeccoligaen. 
 
In appendix C the descriptive statistics are divided into the four TV categories; TV2, 
ZEBRASUN, ZEBRAMON and the games not broadcasted on public television, we see that 
the games broadcasted on the two public channels have a higher average attendance than the 
average attendance of the total games played. The mean position of the teams also is slightly 
higher in the games broadcasted on public TV. This is particularly the case in the games 
broadcasted on TV2. The away team’s reputation also has a considerable higher average value 
on TV2 than in the other games. All this coincides with TV2’s policy and the argument of 
Johnsen and Solvoll (2007) presented in section 2.2.4. 
 
The descriptive statistics clearly give some hints on what we can expect in the regression 
analysis presented in the next chapter, but first and foremost they present us for what 
methodological challenges we are facing.  
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6. Results20 
The results are displayed in table 2. The table displays results from seven regressions with 
various number of variables used. I start with a simple model by only including the TV-
variables, before I add the different categories of other variables to control other effects which 
may have an impact on the attendance. 
 
Regression (1) does not control for any other variable. We see that the proportion of the 
variance in the dependent variable explained by the variance in the independent variables, 
R^2, is 13 per cent. We also see that all three TV-variables have a significant positive impact 
on the attendance, contrary to the hypothesis that football on public TV reduces attendance. 
The coefficients also take a high value. That people attend matches just because they are 
televised sounds unreasonable. This is therefore more likely to reflect the fact that the public 
broadcaster has an incentive to televise games which people would like to attend. The 
interpretation of the dummy coefficients is given by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and 
Kennedy (1981) briefly presented in appendix D. In the subsequent regressions I have added 
the different categories of variables. 
 
In the next regression, specification (2), the home team fixed effects are added. The R^2 
increases to over 85 per cent, indicating that the observable and unobservable characteristics 
related to the home teams are of major importance. These characteristics are, inter alia, 
economic determinants such as admission price and market size. They also capture reputation 
and stadium facilities. In addition it is reasonable to believe that a team can have popular and 
entertaining players or other team qualities that attract more spectators during a season. Fixed 
irrational preferences during a season related to “habit”, “conspicuous consumption” and 
“bandwagon” effects are unobservable variables which also will be taken into account 
through the fixed effect specification. The coefficients of the TV-variables are drastically 
reduced by the introduction of the fixed effects. Their respective t-values also get reduced; the 
zebra games loose their significance, while TV2 still is significant at a one per cent level. This 
indicates that teams which have a high attendance also are televised on a public broadcaster. 
 
 
20 In my regression analysis I have used the software package PcGive10. 
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Table 2: Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Dependent variable 
LNATT Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 8.92923 279 9.82677  236 9.6525 205 10.0626 49.9 10.1868 50.3 10.1820 50.3 10.1660  53.2 
TV-variables 
TV2 
ZEBRASUN 
ZEBRAMON 
 
0.489965 
0.263275 
0.227243 
 
6.86*** 
3.57*** 
3.11*** 
 
0.145077 
0.0502318 
0.0475778 
 
4.38*** 
1.52 
1.46 
 
0.0799 
0.0488 
0.0249 
 
2.30** 
1.53 
0.782 
 
0.0569 
0.0369 
0.0072 
 
1.70* 
1.21 
0.235 
 
0.0630 
0.0355 
-0.0139 
 
1.88* 
1.18 
-0.308 
 
0.0624 
0.0378 
-0.0221 
 
1.87* 
1.25 
-0.488 
 
0.0598 
0.0355 
0.0065 
 
1.85* 
1.19 
0.217 
Uncertainty variables 
POSH 
POSA 
PH 
PHSQ 
UH 
UA 
PLAYED 
REPA 
     
-0.0077 
-0.0038 
-1.1712 
1.0749 
-0.0014 
0.0018 
-0.0001 
0.0016 
 
-1.82* 
-1.19 
-1.47 
1.32 
-0.318 
1..31 
-0.099 
2.72** 
 
-0.0054 
-0.0015 
-1.5248 
1.5284 
-0.0019 
0.0020 
-0.0004 
0.0014 
 
-1.33 
-0.494 
-2.00** 
1.96** 
-0.459 
1.49 
-0.326 
2.43** 
 
-0.0063 
-0.0014 
-1.8979 
1.9040 
-0.0014 
0.0017 
-0.0039 
0.0014 
 
-1.57 
-0.449 
-2.47** 
2.42** 
-0.331 
1.31 
-0.567 
2.48** 
 
-0.0066 
-0.0010 
-1.9329 
1.9162 
-0.0008 
0.0017 
-0.0021 
0.0013 
 
-1.65* 
-0.332 
-2.52** 
2.44** 
-0.195 
1.26 
-0.306 
2.33** 
 
-0.0065 
 
-1.8952 
1.8159 
 
 
 
0.0013 
 
-1.67* 
 
-2.60*** 
2.38** 
 
 
 
2.39** 
Economic variables 
LN(POPA/DIST) 
      
0.0338983 
 
5.77*** 
 
0.0337 
 
5.82*** 
 
0.0344 
 
5.90*** 
 
0.0342 
 
6.00*** 
Timing 
SAT 
WEEK 
16MAY 
MAY 
JUNE/JULY 
AUGUST 
SEPTEMBER 
OCTOBER 
     
 
 
0.0043 
0.0373 
0.1488 
-0.0942 
-0.0230 
0.0225 
-0.0195 
0.0702 
 
0.130 
0.878 
2.25** 
-2.00** 
-0.304 
0.213 
-0.152 
0.459 
 
0.0026 
0.0435 
0.1348 
-0.0907 
-0.0250 
0.0167 
-0.0330 
0.0444 
 
0.077 
1.01 
1.98** 
-1.91* 
-0.327 
0.158 
-0.258 
0.290 
 
 
 
0.1796 
-0.0701 
 
 
 
 
3.26*** 
-2.66*** 
 
Weather 
COLD 
RAIN 
      
0.0239 
-0.0519 
 
0.904 
-1.65* 
 
 
-0.0537 
 
 
-1.78* 
Home team*season 
fixed effects 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 R^2=0.1312 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 4 
R^2= 0.8523 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 30 
R^2= 0.8698 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 38 
R^2= 0. 8813 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 39 
R^2= 0. 8889 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 47 
R^2= 0. 8900 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 49 
R^2= 0. 8856 
No. obs: 364 
No. parameters: 38 
 
***significant at a 1 per cent level 
**significant at a 5 per cent level 
*significant at a 10 per cent level 
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Adding the uncertainty variables in specification (3) reduces the significance of TV2 to a five 
per cent level and the coefficient is also reduced. This indicates that the close and exciting 
games also are televised. This is natural as these games probably also attracts higher audience 
in front of the television. At this stage of the analysis only two uncertainty variables have 
significant impacts. The position of the home team (POSH) has the expected sign and is 
significant at ten per cent level. The position of the away team also has a negative coefficient, 
but it is not significant. The next five uncertainty variables do not play a significant role. 
Reputation of the away team (REPA) is positive and significant at five per cent level. The 
away team’s performance in the league over time has created expectation and prestige among 
the spectators and attracts more people to the stadiums. 
 
The introduction of the economic variable in specification (4) captures the opportunity cost of 
the away supporters. We see that the positive impact of live coverage of games is further 
reduced. The TV2 variable is now significant only at the ten per cent level. The economic 
variable has the expected sign and a high level of significance, implying that the away team’s 
population and the distance between the clubs are important factors in the determination of 
attendance. Controlling for the economic variable also changes the impact of the uncertainty 
variables. Both the home and away team’s position still plays an insignificant role. The 
uncertainty related to the match outcome plays however an important role, (PH) has the 
expected negative impact on the attendance. The relationship between attendance and home 
win probability is also U-shaped. The reason for this is likely to be that the variable not only 
is a measure on uncertainty, but also measure on the probability of number of goals scored 
(Peel and Thomas, 1992)21. A team which scores frequently are more likely to attract people 
to the games than those which do not score that often. Neither the seasonal uncertainty nor the 
stage of the competition has surprisingly any significant impact on the attendance. Although 
the away team’s position does not seem to have any impact on the attendance, the reputation 
(REPA) of the away team still seems to have a positive influence.  
 
The next two regressions, specification (5) and (6), include time variables and weather 
variables (“quality of viewing”) respectively. Controlling for these variables, we see that the 
TV-variables do not change the results dramatically. This is not surprising as timing variables 
and weather typically not is correlated with TV coverage. The ZEBRAMON variable gets 
                                                 
21 Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) argue that this explanation lacks credibility.  
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negative, but it is still not significant. Specification (6) is the completely specified model with 
all variables presented in section 5.2 included. In the full specified model the variables of 
significant importance in the previous regressions still are significant. In addition we see that 
the probability that the home teams position (POSH) plays a negative role in the 
determination of attendance increases. The variable is significant at a ten per cent level. The 
fact that we do not see the same tendency in the case of the away team (POSA) is not 
surprising as the away supporters normally are a small minority of hard core fans in the 
stadiums. The hard core fans showing up at the away games have a strong loyalty to their 
clubs and may fall under addiction concept to Becker and Murphy (1988) presented in section 
3.1.1. Rain has the negative impact and same level of significance in the completely specified 
model. May 16th has a positive influence on attendance at a five per cent level, while the 
month of May attract less people to the stadiums. 
  
The last result presented in table 2 is specification (7). Here I have excluded all variables with 
level of significance lower than ten per cent in specification (6). This does not change the TV 
variables significantly. We also see that the other control variables do not change 
dramatically. The signs are the same as in regression (6) and they have a relatively low level 
of significance. The value of R^2 is also just slightly reduced, with less than one percentage 
point. 
6.1 Discussion 
With the substantial set of control variables available, the TV variables do not get the 
expected negative sign. At first sight this seems a little bit unreasonable. As long as TV is 
assumed to be a substitute those effects should be negative. Thus, there may be a 
misspecification in the model, implying that a relevant unobservable variable is omitted. The 
definitions of the different variables are also a debatable point. Sport economists have 
particularly spent a lot of time on finding convenient measures on the different uncertainty 
variables. In other words, caution most be expressed when interpreting the results. 
 
By omission of a relevant independent variable, the disturbance of the misspecified equation 
will not have a constant zero mean, implying a violation of the second assumption of the OLS 
estimator presented in section 5.1. Kennedy (2003) argues, however, that this should be 
viewed as a violation of the first assumption that the dependent variable is a linear function of 
known independent variables. If the omitted variable is correlated with the included 
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independent variables, the OLS estimator of the coefficients will be biased. If the omitted 
variable is uncorrelated, only the intercept estimator is biased. 
 
Moreover, the results clearly do not support the hypothesis that live televised football games 
on public broadcasters reduce stadium attendance. Even though live broadcasting is a 
substitute of showing up in person, it will never be a perfect substitute. The couch and the 
stands are not equal. We also know that the broadcaster wants to maximize its audience and 
therefore have to advertise the broadcasted sport events. This is also likely to function as 
advertising for the game itself, and not only the program that broadcasts it. Therefore the 
attendance also increases at the stadium when the game is broadcasted. This is in the interest 
of both the broadcaster, which wants a good production with a full and noisy stadium, and the 
football club which wants to maximize the gate revenue. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis I have discussed and analysed the demand for Norwegian premiership football. I 
have particularly looked at the role of television after NFF’s historical sale of rights to the 
TV2 Group and Telenor. There is a clear interdependence between the sport and the media, 
where both actors have the interest of increasing demand. There is however reason to believe 
that some of the potential spectators who got the opportunity of “couch viewing” will in some 
cases drop out of the stadium and stay home in the couch watching the game on television. In 
other words that television viewing is a substitute of showing up at the game. 
 
In my analysis I find no evidences that live covered games on a public broadcaster from the 
Norwegian premiership act as substitutes to showing up at the stadiums in person. In other 
words there is difficult to argue that the clubs lose gate revenue when games are televised by 
a public broadcaster. At least, the loss is more that offset by the transfer of money the TV-
agreement has generated. There are however many variables that are thought to have an 
impact on the attendance. Preferences, economic variables, “quality of viewing”, uncertainty 
of outcome and capacity constraint are all factors that I have outlined and discussed. In other 
words, there is a complex reality out there and an analysis will anyway be simplicities of the 
actual facts. I have however pointed out what factors which apparently are of importance. 
 
Most of the determination seems to be dependent of factors related to each single team. It 
should therefore be in the interest of the league itself and economists to analyse which 
properties related to the teams that are of importance in the determination of the number of 
spectators. Knowledge about that may improve the club’s ability to generate more income 
from gate revenue, which further gives the clubs a potential to develop further in the crave for 
the championship trophy and success in European cups. 
 
Furthermore should the league be careful in disrupt the competitive balance by making the 
financial differences between the clubs larger through TV agreements. We may not have seen 
the consequences of the current agreement in relation to this yet, but the policy makers should 
have this in mind when negotiating future agreements. 
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The 1 billion NOK TV contract also included the opportunity to broadcast Tippeligaen over 
the internet and cellular phones. It was possible for the costumers against payment to watch 
the league through those interactive media the two seasons just analysed. This analysis has 
however not taken this new phenomenon into account when estimating the demand for 
Norwegian football. This is however a growing market, which should be taken into 
considerations in future analysis. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations 
EU – the European Union 
IBF – International Boxing Association 
NFF – Norges Fotballforbund / Norwegian Football Association 
NIFS – Norsk og Internasjonal Fotballstatistikk / Norwegian and International Football 
Statistics 
NRK – Norsk Rikskringkasting / the National Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 
NTF -  Norsk Toppfotball / the Assocation of Norwegian Top Division Clubs 
RSSSF - Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation 
UEFA – the Union of European Football Associations 
WBA – Wold Boxing Association 
WBC – Wold Boxing Council 
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Appendix B: Weather Statistics 
Table B1 shows which weather station I have used to the respective clubs. 
Table B1 
Club Municipality Weather station (Municipality) 
Aalesund FK Ålesund Vigra (Giske) 
SK Brann Bergen Flesland (Bergen) 
Fredrikstad FK Fredrikstad Sarpsborg (Sarpsborg) 
HamKam Hamar Stavsberg (Hamar) 
Lillestrøm Skedsmo Blindern (Oslo) 
FC Lyn Oslo Blindern (Oslo) 
Molde FK Molde Hjelvik-Myrbø (Rauma) 
Odd Grenland Skien Kongsberg Brannstasjon (Kongsberg) 
Rosenborg Trondheim Trondheim - voll (Trondheim) 
Sandefjord Sandefjord Melsom (Stokke) 
Stabæk Bærum Blindern (Oslo) 
IK Start Kristiansand Kjevik (Kristiansand) 
Strømsgodset IF Drammen Kongsberg Brannstasjon (Kongsberg) 
Tromsø IL Tromsø Tromsø (Tromsø) 
Viking Stavanger Sola (Sola) 
Vålerenga Oslo Blindern (Oslo) 
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Appendix C: More Descriptive Statistics 
Table C1–C4 displays the descriptive statistics on the observations divided in respect to the 
four TV categories: TV2, ZEBRASUN, ZEBRAMON and non-public TV (subscription TV). 
Table C1: Tv2 
 
 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min max 
ATT 53 13502 5286.9 4264 21901 
POSH 53 5.8868 4.2456 1 14 
POSA 53 5.0566 4.0782 1 14 
PH 53 0.41599 0.097859 0.28323 0.679583 
PHSQ 53 0.18244 0.090429 0.08022 0.46183 
UH 53 3.0657 5.5895 0 33.33333 
UA 53 2.9263 2.8352 0 14.28571 
PLAYED 53 12.340 7.5293 0 25 
REPA 53 38.234 24.197 0 120.8307 
SAT 53 0.037736 0.19238 0 1 
WEEK 53 0.094340 0.29510 0 1 
16MAY 53 0.037736 0.19238 0 1 
MAY 53 0.20755 0.40943 0 1 
JUNE/JULY 53 0.22642 0.42252 0 1 
AUGUST 53 0.11321 0.31988 0 1 
SEPTEMBER 53 0.13208 0.34181 0 1 
OKT/NOV 53 0.16981 0.37906 0 1 
COLD 53 0.28302 0.45478 0 1 
RAIN 53 0.15094 0.36142 0 1 
POPA 53 162712.9 90988. 27909 274308.5 
DIST 53 454.79 401.54 1 1810 
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Table C2: ZEBRASUN 
 
 
 No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min max 
ATT 49 10998 4835.2 2563 21146 
POSH 49 7.8367 4.2148 1 14 
POSA 49 7.1837 4.0346 1 14 
PH 49 0.45280 0.11917 0.274681 0.738916 
PHSQ 49 0.21894 0.11538 0.07545 0.546 
UH 49 1.5108 1.3245 0 4.545455 
UA 49 1.6800 1.6240 0 6.66667 
PLAYED 49 12.653 7.7178 0 25 
REPA 49 17.588 13.001 0 48.77051 
SAT 49 0.040816 0.19991 0 1 
WEEK 49 0.081633 0.27664 0 1 
16MAY 49 0.040816 0.19991 0 1 
MAY 49 0.18367 0.39123 0 1 
JUNE/JULY 49 0.20408 0.40721 0 1 
AUGUST 49 0.12245 0.33120 0 1 
SEPTEMBER 49 0.14286 0.35355 0 1 
OKT/NOV 49 0.18367 0.39123 0 1 
COLD 49 0.22449 0.42157 0 1 
RAIN 49 0.16327 0.37344 0 1 
POPA 49 95789 76590 24254 274309 
DIST 49 499.20 498.41 1 1990 
Table C3: ZEBRAMON 
  No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min max 
ATT 50 10398 4771.2 4473 21398 
POSH 50 7 4.3425 1 14 
POSA 50 7.9 4.2964 1 15 
PH 50 0.44451 0.12548 0.189113 0.680607 
PHSQ 50 0.21302 0.11426 0.03576 0.46323 
UH 50 2.5124 2.6795 0 16.66667 
UA 50 1.9452 2.1277 0 12.5 
PLAYED 50 11.94 6.8940 0 23 
REPA 50 27.841 25.048 0 120.8307 
SAT 50 0.1 0.30305 0 1 
WEEK 50 0.86 0.35051 0 1 
16MAY 50 0 0 0 0 
MAY 50 0.16 0.37033 0 1 
JUNE/JULY 50 0.26 0.44309 0 1 
AUGUST 50 0.16 0.37033 0 1 
SEPTEMBER 50 0.14 0.35051 0 1 
OKT/NOV 50 0.12 0.32826 0 1 
COLD 50 0.22 0.41845 0 1 
RAIN 50 0.060000 0.23990 0 1 
POPA 50 126275.7 90101 24254 274309 
DIST 50 433.94 456.04 1 1965 
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Table C4: NON-PUBLIC TV 
  No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min max 
ATT 212 8477.5 4434 3620 22330 
POSH 212 8.2217 3.8494 1 16 
POSA 212 7.8868 3.8152 1 16 
PH 212 0.43827 0.10291 0.20263 0.72604 
PHSQ 212 0.20263 0.094665 0.04106 0.52714 
UH 212 1.3756 1.3722 0 0.83333 
UA 212 2.5499 9.8634 0 100 
PLAYED 212 12.627 7.6343 0 25 
REPA 212 22.287 24.082 0 120.8307 
SAT 212 0.15094 0.35884 0 1 
WEEK 212 0.099057 0.29945 0 1 
16MAY 212 0.047170 0.21250 0 1 
MAY 212 0.19811 0.39952 0 1 
JUNE/JULY 212 0.22170 0.41637 0 1 
AUGUST 212 0.11321 0.31760 0 1 
SEPTEMBER 212 0.12736 0.33416 0 1 
OKT/NOV 212 0.18868 0.39218 0 1 
COLD 212 0.30660 0.46217 0 1 
RAIN 212 0.11792 0.32328 0 1 
POPA 212 104380.8 80897 24254 274309 
DIST 212 568.38 557.63 1 1990 
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Appendix D: Interpretation of Dummy Variables 
The interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic equations is not that straight 
forward as for other variables, so care most be taken when interpreting them. The following 
interpretation is given by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981):  
 
Let ĉ be the estimate of the dummy variable coefficient c. The percentage effect of that 
dummy variable is then not 100ĉ. ĉ is however an estimate of )1ln( gc += where 100g is the 
correct measure on the percentage effect of the dummy variable. The expression of g is given 
by Kennedy (1981): 
1)ˆ(ˆ
2
1ˆexp* −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= cVcg     where is an estimate of the variance of ĉ. )ˆ(ˆ cV
 
Using this estimate on the percentage impact of live broadcasted games on attendance, we get 
the following results in the seven regressions presented: 
 
Table D1: Impact of Public Broadcasting on Attendance 
 Regression 1  Regression 2  
 TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON
ĉ 0.489965 0.263275 0.227430 0.145077 0.050232 0.047578
Vˆ  0.005107 0.005439 0.005351 0.001098 0.001088 0.001088
g 0.628097 0.297651 0.252015 0.155494 0.050943 0.048171
% impact 62.8097 29.7651 25.2015 15.5494 5.0943 4.817125
 Regression 3  Regression 4  
 TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON
ĉ 0.079888 0.048838 0.024886 0.056924 0.036873 0.007182
Vˆ  0.001211 0.001013 0.001013 0.001118 0.000925 0.000931
g 0.082510 0.049518 0.024679 0.057984 0.037081 0.006740
% impact 8.2510 4.9518 2.4679 5.7984 3.7081 0.6740
 Regression 5  Regression 6  
 TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON
ĉ 0.062970 0.035504 -0,013878 0.062429 0.037787 -0.022143
Vˆ  0.001118 0.000906 0.000906 0.001114 0.000908 0.000908
g 0.064400 0.035673 -0.014785 0.063826 0.038039 -0.022905
% impact 6.4300 3.5673 -1.478462 6.3826 3.8039 -2.2905
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 Regression 7  
 TV2 ZEBRASUN ZEBRAMON
ĉ 0.059836 0.035519 0.006466
Vˆ  0.001049 0.000886 0.000886
g 0.061107 0.035698 0.006040
% impact 6.110566 3.5698 0.6040
 
  
